At that crucial moment in the Roman de la Rose when Faus Semblant and Astenance Contrainte set off in the guise of pilgrims to silence Male Bouche, Astenance Contrainte, disguised as a beguine, is compared to.

In September 2008, 10 years after the untimely death of Pere Alberch (1954–1998), the 20th Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology gathered a group of Pere’s students, col- laborators, and colleagues (Figure 1) to celebrate his contribu- tions to the origins of EvoDevo. Hosted by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) outside Vienna, the group met for two days of discussion. The meeting was organized in tandem with a congress held in May 2008 at the Cavanilles Institute (...) for Biodiversity and Evolutionary Biology (ICBiBE) in Valencia, Spain. The talks at the KLI were equal parts: nostalgic remembrance, excitement over new ways of thinking about old problems, and an unrepressed vitriol against the resurgence of reductionist thinking in EvoDevo. Here we highlight some of the key aspects of Pere’s life and work that informed and infused the talks. (shrink)

In Truthfulness and Tragedy Stanley Hauerwas provides an account of moral existence and ethical rationality that shows how Christian convictions operate, or should operate, to form and direct lives. In attempting to conceptualize the basis of Christian ethics in a manner that will render Christian convictions morally intelligible, the author casts fresh light on traditional theoretical issues and articulates the distinctive Christian response to contemporary concerns such as suicide, medical ethics, and child care. The first section of the book deals (...) with methodological issues: the meaning and nature of practical reason, obligation claims, natural law, and self deception, and the affinity of story and ethics. It focuses on the relation of truthfulness and tragedy and the need for a story--a set of religious convictions or "grammar of theology"--that does justice to the tragic character of human existence. The second section addresses substantive issues: suicide, euthanasia, and the value of survival; the moral limits of population growth; the definition of "person" for medical reasons; and social involvement and Christian ethics. The overall theme is the need for a community in which truthfulness is a way of life. In the final section, devoted to the problem of how to care for retarded children, the implications of the author's ethical position are given concrete expression. He discusses the assumptions underlying the willingness to have children, criteria for humanness, medical ethics, and how truthful communities deal with suffering. In Truthfulness and Tragedy Stanley Hauerwas extends and clarifies the ethical position set forth in his earlier books Character and the Christian Life and Vision and Virtue. He is associate professor of theology at the University of Notre Dame. He was a senior fellow in Christian medical ethics at the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of Reproduction and Bioethics, and taught medical ethics at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston. (shrink)

What system of morals should rational people select as the best for society? Using a contemporary psychological theory of action and of motivation, Richard Brandt's Oxford lectures argue that the purpose of living should be to strive for the greatest good for the largest number of people. Brandt's discussions range from the concept of welfare to conflict between utilitarian moral codes and the dictates of self-interest.

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.

Richard Brandt is one of the most eminent and influential of contemporary moral philosophers. His work has been concerned with how to justify what is good or right not by reliance on intuitions or theories about what moral words mean but by the explanation of moral psychology and the description of what it is to value something, or to think it immoral. His approach thus stands in marked contrast to the influential theories of John Rawls. The essays reprinted in (...) this collection span a period of almost 30 years and include many classic pieces in metaethical and normative ethical theory. The collection is aimed at both those moral philosophers familiar with Brandt's work and at those philosophers who may be largely unfamiliar with his work. The latter group will be struck by the lucid unpretentious style and the cumulative weight of Brandt's contributions to topics that remain at the forefront of moral philosophy. (shrink)

In her controversial paper, Anna Smajdor proposes that brain-dead people could be used as gestation units for prospective parents unable or unwilling to undertake the act themselves—what she terms whole body gestational donation (WBGD). She explores the ethical issues of such an idea and, comparing it with traditional organ donation, asserts that such deceased surrogacy could be a way of outsourcing pregnancy’s harms to a populace unable to be affected by them. She argues that if the prospect is unacceptable, this (...) may reveal some underlying problems with traditional cadaveric organ donation. Smajdor’s analysis, however, overlooks several problems arising from WBGD. This paper provides an account of those issues and argues that, in addition to WBGD being viscerally unpleasant, it is also ethically unviable. The paper starts by providing an account of WBGD before acknowledging its negative response within traditional and social media. After arguing that such cursory and gut reactions are insufficient to reject the proposal outright, this paper then provides three concerns regarding WBGD omitted by Smajdor: (i) the co-opting of life-saving organs for reproduction, (ii) the discrepancy between using cadaveric organs to save a life versus creating one, and (iii) the universalization of feminist concerns regarding reproductive body commodification. The paper concludes by tentatively agreeing with Smajdor that considering WBGD may help reveal vulnerable assumptions regarding organ donation and surrogacy, but that the significant ethical issues raised may prove insurmountable and make the intervention—thought experiment or otherwise—untenable. (shrink)

Religious violence may trigger feelings of repulsion and indignation, especially in a society that encourages toleration and respect, but rejection contradicts the principles of inclusion that define a democracy and its core moral values. How can we think ethically about religious violence and terrorism, especially in the wake of such atrocities as 9/11? Known for his skillful interrogation of ethical issues as they pertain to religion, politics, and culture, Richard B. Miller returns to the basic tenets of liberalism to (...) divine an ethical response to religious extremism. He questions how we should think about the claims and aspirations of political religions, especially when they conflict so deeply with liberal norms and practices, and he suggests how liberal critics can speak confidently in ways that respect cultural and religious difference. Miller explores other concerns within these investigations as well, such as the protection of human rights and a liberal democratic commitment to multicultural politics. In relating religion and ethics, he develops a new lens for viewing political religions and their moral responsibilities. This probing inquiry also forces us to rethink our response to 9/11. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses three claims on behalf of the Iraq war made by the Bush administration and by various defenders of the war. Then it steps back from the specifics of these three rationales to ask whether they are in fact of the same sort.

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

Individuals with body integrity identity disorder seek to address a non-delusional incongruity between their body image and their physical embodiment, sometimes via the surgical amputation of healthy body parts. Opponents to the provision of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation in cases of BIID make appeals to the envisioned harms that such an intervention would cause, harms such as the creation of a lifelong physical disability where none existed before. However, this concept of harm is often based on a normative biomedical model of (...) health and disability, a model which conflates amputation with impairment, and impairment with a disability. This article challenges the prima facie harms assumed to be inherent in limb amputation and argues in favour of a potential treatment option for those with BIID. To do this, it employs the social model of disability as a means to separate the concept of impairment and disability and thereby separate the acute and chronic harms of the practice of therapeutic healthy-limb amputation. It will then argue that provided sufficient measures are put in place to ensure that those with atypical bodily constructions are not disadvantaged, the chronic harms of elective amputation would cease to be. (shrink)

Opponents of the provision of therapeutic, healthy limb amputation in Body Integrity Identity Disorder cases argue that such surgeries stand in contrast to the goal of medical practice – that of health restoration and maintenance. This paper refutes such a conclusion via an appeal to the nuanced and reflective model of health proposed by Georges Canguilhem. The paper examines the conceptual entanglement of the statistically common with the normatively desirable, arguing that a healthy body can take multiple forms, including that (...) of an amputee, provided that such a form enables the continuing ability to initiate new norms of existence. It concludes that the practice of healthy limb amputation in cases of Body Integrity Identity Disorder is not only compatible with the goal of medicine but is potentially the only method of achieving this goal in the face of a complex and often mischaracterized disorder. (shrink)

This paper explores the impact that developments in the field of neuroprosthetics will have on the ethical viability of healthy limb amputation, specifically in cases of Body Integrity Identity Dis...

Interventions are medically necessary when they are vital in achieving the goal of medicine. However, with varying perspectives comes varying views on what interventions are (un)necessary and, thus, what potential treatment options are available for those suffering from the myriad of conditions, pathologies and disorders afflicting humanity. Medical necessity's teleological nature is perhaps best illustrated in cases where there is debate over using contentious medical interventions as a last resort. For example, whether it is appropriate for those suffering from body (...) integrity dysphoria to receive healthy limb amputations. This paper explores how one's perception of medicine's goal underpins whether interventions are necessary or unnecessary, using the controversial topic of therapeutic amputation as an example. By contrasting ‘classical’ amputations with their more contentious counterparts, it highlights how the idea of medical necessity influences and restrains clinical decision-making. The paper starts by giving an account of body integrity dysphoria, focusing on the debate concerning elective amputation's justifiability. It then introduces Georges Canguilhem's vitalist theory of health, paying particular attention to his emphasis on adaptability. Then, this paper uses his theory as a lens through which to evaluate the appropriateness of therapeutic amputation as a medically necessary procedure. Ultimately, the paper highlights how the label of medical necessity is withheld from potential therapeutic interventions because they fail to conform to pre-established ideas of medicine's purpose and that by doing so, potential harm befalls those who are left with no effective treatments and must look for solutions in the non-clinical world. (shrink)

Most people interested in the problems of ethics aspire to two kinds of knowledge, one systematic, the other historical. They wish a systematic understanding of the field: knowledge of what are the various problems and their interrelations and knowledge of what has been done toward the solution of these problems. They also wish to learn what the great historical philosophers -- particularly those who have had the most important ideas about values and conduct -- have said about the subject. This (...) book is intended to enable the reader to approximate the achievement of these twin goals at once. (shrink)

Clouser and Gert’s 'A Critique of Principlism’ (1990) has ignited debate over the adequacy of substituting principlism for moral theory as a means for dealing with biomedical dilemmas. Clouser and Gert argue that this sort of substitution is not adequate to the task. I examine their argument in light of recent defences of principlism on this score, those of B. Andrew Lustig (1992), David Degrazia (1992), and Beauchamp and Childress (1994). I argue that both sides in the debate have assumed (...) differing conceptions of a moral theory that virtually guarantee their respective conclusions. These differing conceptions are motivated by antecedent epistemological commitments. The present debate over principlism is therefore inconclusive. Future discussion should focus on the underlying epistemological issues. (shrink)